Numbers

The Numbers

Figures converted from Indian Rupees at historical FX rates — see data/company.json.fx_rates for the rate table. Ratios, margins, and multiples are unitless and unchanged.

IOC trades at 5.6x trailing earnings and right at book value despite generating $4.10 billion of net income on a TTM basis — the cheapness reflects three real things (regulated marketing margins that swing 200% year on year with crude, a heavy capex program eating most operating cash, and majority government ownership that caps both pricing freedom and capital returns) and one mispriced thing (the petchem-pipeline-lubricants stack which earns through-cycle returns close to private peers). The single metric that can rerate or derate this stock is the integrated GRM-plus-marketing margin per barrel — when it normalizes above $72 per tonne IOC clears its cost of capital comfortably; below that, it does not.

Snapshot

Closing price ₹142.20 on 30-Apr-2026, converted at the latest available FX rate. Dollar figures use the period-end rate applicable to each fiscal year.

Is this a healthy, durable business?

Three signals in one row. ROCE has stayed in the 5–22% band over twelve years — IOC earns its cost of capital in good crude years and undershoots it badly in bad ones. Debt-to-EBITDA sits comfortably under 2x today but blew out to nearly 5x in the FY20 demand collapse. Cash conversion (Operating CF / Net Income) has averaged 2.1x over a decade, well above 1.0 — IOC's reported earnings consistently understate the cash the business actually throws off, because depreciation on a $24 billion asset base is the largest non-cash charge.

Revenue and earnings power — twelve-year view

Revenue scaled from $81.6 billion (FY14) to a peak of $102.4 billion in FY23 — the FY23 spike was the post-Ukraine crude shock that hurt margins; FY24's revenue fell modestly while operating income jumped 2.4x as inventory tailwinds and product cracks normalized. The story is not growth; it is operating leverage on volatile gross margins.

The visible four-quarter "good year, bad year" rhythm in margins is the entire investment debate. FY18, FY21 and FY24 — operating margin near 10%, net margin above 5% — are what IOC looks like when crude is benign and marketing margins are intact. FY15, FY20, FY23 and FY25 are the opposite.

Quarterly direction — last thirteen quarters

The Sep-2024 loss quarter (operating margin 2%, $54M net loss) is the clearest data point in the file: when crude inventory marks turn and marketing margins compress simultaneously, IOC's earnings flip sign in a single three-month window. The recovery into the December-2025 quarter (margin 11%, $1.5B profit) is the mirror image — and it is what the current price already partly assumes will repeat.

Cash generation — are the earnings real?

Across the last decade, CFO has averaged 2.1x reported net income — driven by the roughly $2 billion annual depreciation charge on IOC's refining and pipeline asset base. The FY24 cash haul ($8.5B CFO on $5.2B profit) is what a strong-margin year looks like when working capital simultaneously releases cash. The FY19–FY20 dip (CFO below NI) is the warning shot: when crude collapses fast, payables shrink before receivables and inventory can be drawn down.

This is the chart bears point at. Capex has averaged roughly $3 billion a year and has not fallen below $2 billion in a decade. In the four soft-margin years (FY19, FY20, FY23, FY25), free cash flow was negative, marginal, or near-zero. The big capex cycle — Panipat petrochem expansion, Paradip aromatics, ethanol/2G biofuel plants, hydrogen — runs hot through at least FY27. Until that capex envelope shrinks, FCF visibility stays low even when refining margins are normal.

Capital allocation — what shareholders actually receive

Dividend payout ratio over twelve years has bounced between 28% and 90% of profit, with FY18 a generous outlier. Bonus issues in 2017, 2018 and 2022 have roughly 6x'ed the share count since FY14, so per-share dividends look weaker than aggregate payouts suggest. There are no buybacks of consequence; the Government of India holds 51.5% and the dividend stream is the explicit shareholder-return tool.

Useful frame: IOC has paid out roughly $5.7 billion of dividends across FY21–FY25. At the current $21 billion market cap and a 4.9% trailing yield, dividends are roughly half the prospective return — the rest needs to come from earnings normalization, not multiple expansion.

Balance sheet flexibility

Total debt has roughly 1.1x'ed since FY14 ($15.9B → $17.8B) while equity has grown 4.0x in dollar terms — net leverage has trended down, not up, despite the capex cycle. The September-2025 balance sheet shows $16.5B of debt against equity of $22.2B (D/E 0.74). The two stress periods — FY20 (debt/EBITDA 4.9x as crude crashed) and FY25 (2.9x as margins compressed) — show the cycle in action: leverage looks safe in the average and tight in the bad year.

Working capital signature

Negative working capital days are a structural feature — IOC sells most product through dealers on tight credit while running 60+ days of crude/product inventory financed by trade credit and short-term borrowings. This is the model's source of cash leverage: when prices rise, inventory gains; when they fall, inventory marks bite first.

Valuation — twelve-year history with current price

The valuation read. Current 5.6x trailing P/E sits roughly 40% below the 12-year median of about 9x, and current P/B at 0.99x is dead-on the long-run median of 1.0x. The two prior periods that traded at 4–5x earnings (FY21, FY22) did so coming off a profit shock and were followed by 50–80% rerates within 18 months. The current discount is real but not unprecedented; what is unusual is that it co-exists with a record net debt position and an extended capex cycle that limits FCF.

Peers — same industry, very different multiples

The gap that matters: IOC trades at the same P/E as BPCL and HPCL but earns roughly half the ROCE and ROE of either, and pays a similar dividend yield. The market is treating the three OMCs as one trade — and within that trade IOC is being valued like the lowest-quality of the three, which the FY25 returns broadly justify. The mispricing case rests on FY26–27 returns converging back toward BPCL/HPCL as the petchem and pipeline projects monetize.

Fair value — three scenarios

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The base case — through-cycle EPS of $0.19 and a 9x multiple in line with the 12-year median — implies modest 14% upside. The asymmetry favors the bull case (44% upside) only if FY27 marketing margins normalize and the petchem complex ramps as guided. The bear case (43% downside) requires sustained sub-$37/tonne marketing margins through FY28, which would also force the dividend to be cut for the first time since FY20 — a low-probability but non-trivial tail.

What to take away

The numbers confirm that IOC is a structurally cyclical refiner-marketer with low through-cycle returns on capital, real cash conversion when margins cooperate, and a balance sheet that gets stretched at the bottom of every crude cycle. The numbers contradict the popular line that this is a "broken" stock priced for failure — book value per share has compounded at roughly 10% in local currency over twelve years, the dividend has not been cut since FY20, and net leverage today is lower than it was at the FY20 trough despite a much larger asset base. What to watch in the next two prints: (i) integrated GRM-plus-marketing-margin per tonne — the single number that drives operating income — and (ii) the FY27 capex outlook in the next annual report, because every $533M of capex deferral converts directly into roughly $0.04/share of free cash flow that is currently invisible to the multiple.